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DOE V. BELL
(decided January 9, 2003)
HARLEY ABREVAYA*
Dorothy Parker observed that “heterosexuality is not normal, it
is just common.”1 If so, then what is “normal?” At some point, the
line between normal and abnormal might become so blurred that it
becomes “normal” to be “abnormal.”2 Were that to happen, those
considered “abnormal,” such as people with physical or mental disabilities might lose their protected status within society.
In Doe v. Bell, the Supreme Court of New York addressed the
issue of whether gender identity disorder (GID) constitutes a disability and, if so, whether Atlantic Transitional Foster Care Facility’s
dress code unlawfully discriminated against Jean Doe, a biological
male who identified as a woman, in violation of article 15 of the
New York State Human Rights Law (NYHRL).3 The court concluded that Atlantic’s dress code discriminated against Doe in violation of the NYHRL because Atlantic refused to reasonably
accommodate Doe’s GID needs.4 With this holding, the court ex* J.D. candidate, 2006, New York Law School.
1. Thinkexist.com, Dorothy Parker Quotes, http://en.thinkexist.com/quotation/heterosexuality_is_not_normal-it-s_just/182842.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
2. See generally Carlos A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights Philosophy, 80 N.C.L. REV. 371 (2002) (discussing the distinction between normal and abnormal sexual desires).
3. 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2003). Note the court’s use of the
name “Jean Doe” to refer to the plaintiff. According to the opinion, although biologically a male, Doe prefers to be referred to as “she” because she identifies as a woman.
Id. at 846 n.1. The court noted that gender identity disorder is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Id. According to the court, the manual recognizes three components of GID:
(i) ‘a strong and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire
to be, or the insistence that one is, of the opposite sex’; (ii) ‘there must also
be evidence of that persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a
sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex’; and (iii) ‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.’
Id. at 848 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532-33 (4th ed. 1994)).
4. Id. at 851.
993
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panded the already broad definition of “disability” under the
NYHRL to include a person with GID.5
This case comment contends that although the holding of Doe
is correct based on the legal test applied, the twenty-year-old case
from which it derives, State Division of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott
v. Xerox, 6 is outdated in today’s society. In light of Doe, this comment suggests that it is time to revisit the Xerox test. By defining
conditions such as GID as “disabilities,” the test undermines the severity of serious mental and physical disabilities. In addition, the
test might cause the word “disability” to lose its significance and
protected status within society. This comment concludes that New
York should adopt the standard articulated in the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) to determine what constitutes a disability
while statutorily excluding other conditions from being deemed
“disabilities.”7
Jean Doe was a seventeen-year-old biological male who had
been in the foster care system since age nine.8 Doe’s psychiatrist,
Dr. Spritz, diagnosed Doe as having GID.9 The diagnosis was based
on: (1) Doe’s identification as a woman; (2) her preference for
wearing women’s clothing; (3) her aversion to wearing men’s clothing; and (4) the awkward and uncomfortable feelings she experienced when she wore men’s clothing.10 Dr. Spritz’s treatment plan
for Doe recommended that she dress as a woman in order to facilitate acceptance of her “internal identity.”11 Dr. Spritz explained
that forcing youths with GID to dress contrary to their internal
identity “causes significant anxiety, psychological harm, and antisocial behavior.”12
Doe lived in Atlantic, an all-male short-term foster care placement center.13 From the time of her admission in January 2002,
Doe was denied the right to wear female clothing within the facil5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
65 N.Y.2d 213 (1985).
See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ity.14 In March 2002, Wayne Antoine, the director of Atlantic, issued a memo to his employees declaring that Doe was “not
permitted to wear female attire in the facility.”15 Antoine did, however, allow Doe to wear women’s accessories such as scarves, bras,
and fake nails.16 Doe’s attorney complained to the Administration
for Children’s Services (ACS) that Atlantic was denying Doe the
right to dress as a woman.17 ACS responded that it denied Doe
permission to wear female clothing because of its need to “protect
the safety and welfare of the resident children.”18
On July 18, 2002, Doe petitioned the Supreme Court of New
York for injunctive relief and demanded that ACS allow her to wear
women’s clothing at Atlantic.19 Doe alleged that Atlantic’s dress
code constituted unlawful disability discrimination in violation of
the NYHRL20 and violated Doe’s federal constitutional right to freedom of expression.21 Doe argued that under the broad definition
of “disability” in the NYHRL, GID rendered her “disabled”22 and, in
failing to reasonably accommodate her disability, Atlantic unlawfully discriminated against her.23 Shortly after Doe filed her petition, Antoine announced a new dress code at Atlantic, requiring all
residents to wear pants and shirts while living at the facility.24
Defendant ACS argued that Atlantic did not fail to reasonably
accommodate Doe for three reasons.25 First, Atlantic did not know
she was disabled and, therefore, was not aware it had to accommo14. Id. at 849. Wayne Antoine, Atlantic’s director, agreed that Doe could wear
women’s clothes only as she was exiting Atlantic. Id. Upon returning to the facility,
Antoine required that Doe be immediately escorted to her room to change into more
acceptable clothing. Id.
15. Id. (quotation omitted). It should be noted that throughout this memo, Antoine repeatedly referred to Doe as “he.” Id. In doing so, Antoine appeared to ignore
Doe’s wishes to be known as a woman, a product of her GID. Id. at 848.
16. Id. at 849. In allowing this exception, Antoine failed to consider that such
female accessories already allowed Doe to appear more like a woman.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quotation omitted).
19. Id.
20. N.Y. EXEC. § 291 (Consol. 1951).
21. Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
22. Id. at 850.
23. Id. at 848.
24. Id. at 850.
25. Id. at 854.
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date her.26 Second, Atlantic had provided Doe with a limited accommodation by allowing her to wear women’s accessories.27 ACS
contended that to allow a “broader accommodation” would jeopardize the “safety and security” of Atlantic’s other residents.28 In
particular, ACS asserted that if Doe were to wear women’s clothing
it would cause other Atlantic residents to feel “confused or
threatened” and to “act out.”29 Finally, ACS argued that Doe was
evicted from a previous foster care facility for misconduct; thus, she
should not complain about Atlantic’s dress code.30
The court rejected defendant’s arguments.31 Relying on State
Division of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox, it reasoned that
the term “disability” was broadly defined under the NYHRL because
it encompassed physical, mental, and medical impairments.32 In
Xerox, the Court of Appeals held that to qualify as a disability under
the statute, the condition at issue must prevent the exercise of a
normal bodily function, or be demonstrable by medically accepted
clinical or diagnostic techniques.33 The Doe court held that because GID was clinically diagnosed by Dr. Spritz using medically accepted standards, the second prong of the Xerox test was satisfied;
therefore, Doe’s condition qualified as a disability under the
statute.34
The Doe court next addressed whether Atlantic’s failure to exempt Doe from its dress code discriminated against her.35 Relying
on Ocean Gate Associates Starrett Systems, Inc. v. Dopico, the court held
that Atlantic discriminated against Doe because it failed to make
26. Id.
27. Id. This argument seems to be in direct contradiction to the defendant’s contention that it did not know Doe was disabled and, therefore, did not know they needed
to accommodate her. The court did not explore this contradiction.
28. Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
29. Id. at 855.
30. Id. at 856. To read more about New York State foster care facilities, see Sally
K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 1 (2002).
31. Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
32. Id. at 850 (citing Xerox, 65 N.Y.2d at 220).
33. Xerox, 65 N.Y.2d at 218-19. See N.Y. EXEC. § 292[21] (Consol. 2005).
34. Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 851. The court noted that Doe was also examined by a
second psychiatrist, Dr. Levin of the Family Court Mental Health Services, who concurred with Dr. Spitz’s diagnosis that Doe suffered from GID. Id.
35. Id. at 853.
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reasonable accommodations for her disability.36 In Dopico, the
court denied a motion for summary judgment, reasoning that a
landlord should make reasonable accommodations for a tenant
with a disability by allowing the tenant to keep a pet despite a no
pets clause in the lease.37 In that case, the tenant was wheelchairbound and a dog was necessary to allow the tenant the freedom to
use the dwelling.38 Among other things, the dog helped detect
smoke and fire to ensure the tenant would not be victimized.39
Similarly, the Doe court reasoned that if Doe were not allowed to
wear women’s clothing, she would suffer severe emotional and psychological distress.40 Therefore, the exemption was reasonable,
and would allow Doe full and equal freedom to use and enjoy Atlantic’s facilities.41
The court found ACS’s argument that Atlantic was not aware
Doe was disabled unpersuasive because the evidence demonstrated
several instances in which Atlantic had been alerted to Doe’s condition.42 As to its second argument that Atlantic had already made
limited accommodations to Doe by allowing her to wear women’s
accessories such as scarves, bras, and fake nails, the court held that
allowing Doe to dress in woman’s clothing was not substantially different from wearing women’s accessories.43 Finally, ACS argued
that Doe was evicted from a previous foster care facility for misconduct and, therefore, should not complain about Atlantic’s dress
code.44 In response, the Doe court held that Doe’s alleged miscon36. Id. at 853 (citing Ocean Gate Assoc. Starrett Systems, Inc. v. Dopico, 441
N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981)). Note that the NYHRL requires “covered entities to
provide persons with disabilities reasonable accommodations . . . to ensure that persons
with disabilities enjoy equality of opportunity.” Id. at 851 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(18)(2) (McKinney 2000).
37. Dopico, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
38. Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Doe court looked to the text of the NYHRL to determine what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 852-53. It concluded that the Dopico decision was a good model, but that all accommodations sought need not be granted,
especially if the accommodation proposed would cause “undue hardship on the entity
or is . . . otherwise unreasonable.” Id. at 853.
42. Id. at 854.
43. Id. at 855.
44. Id. at 855-56.
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duct at a previous foster care facility gave Atlantic “no license to
discriminate against her by denying her a reasonable accommodation.”45 In finding that Doe’s condition qualified as a disability
under the Xerox test, the court accepted the testimony that GID was
medically diagnosable.46 Although correct under existing law, the
Xerox test is outdated and should be re-examined.
The broad language of the Xerox test, with its emphasis on the
“medical” aspects of disability, risks turning every condition into a
type of disability.47 Examples of conditions that would fit within the
plain meaning of the second prong of the Xerox test include compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania, all of which the
ADA wisely excludes from the definition of “disability” because they
are better characterized as impulse control disorders.48 At some
point, most psychological illnesses will be characterized using the
language of medical diagnosis, even ones as common as internet
addiction,49 video game addiction,50 or being a shopaholic.51 If
45. Id. at 856. The court also reminded defendants that each and every foster
care facility must comply with the NYHRL to provide reasonable accommodations. Id.
46. Id. at 850-51.
47. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 298 n.224 (1999).
48. The rationale behind their exclusion from the ADA is explored later in this
comment. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60; see also Cynthia Haines, Types of
Mental Disorders, WEBMD, Feb. 21, 2006, http://webmd.com/content/article/60/
67134.htm (outlining characterization of compulsive gambling, kleptomania and pyromania as “impulse control disorders”). People afflicted with these types of disorders are
“unable to resist urges, or impulses, to perform acts that could be harmful to themselves
or others. Pyromania (starting fires), kleptomania (stealing) and compulsive gambling
are examples of impulse control disorders. . ..Often, people with these disorders become so involved with the objects of their addiction that they begin to ignore responsibilities and relationships.” Id.; see also DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, supra note 4, at 312.34-39 (explaining the diagnostic characteristics of impulse-control disorders including kleptomania and compulsive gambling); Norman H.
Kirshman, ADA: The 10 Most Common Disabilities and How to Accommodate Them, FINDLAW,
Mar. 1, 1997, http://library.findlaw.com/1997/Mar/1/126914.html (explaining the
ADA and the mechanics of ADA claims and statutory definitions).
49. See Sarah Kershaw, Hooked on the Web: Help Is on the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2005, at G1; Verlyn Klinkenborg, Editorial, ‘No Messages on This Server,’ and Other Lessons
of Our Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 15.
50. See Drake Lucas, Games Ruining Players’ Lives?, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE, Jan. 30,
2006; Amie Thompson, Fun and Games or Addiction?, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Nov. 22,
2005, at 12K.
51. See Carey Goldberg, Shopping Addicts: When the Urge to Shop Overtakes the Rational
Processes of Mind and Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 13, at 1.
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these conditions were held to be disabilities under the NYHRL, it
would undermine the gravity of severe mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.
The test to determine what qualifies as a disability under the
ADA is narrower than the Xerox text applied in Doe.52 A person with
a disability is one who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an
impairment.53 Under this standard, GID probably would not qualify as a disability. In the scientific community, there has been much
debate as to exactly what causes GID and how to diagnose it.54
Given this debate, attempting to demonstrate that GID substantially
limits a major life activity might prove problematic. In fact, several

52. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
53. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (2000). See also Kirshman, supra note 49 (explaining that the ADA’s definition of disability “is based upon
the definition of ‘handicap’ found in the Rehabilitation Act. A judgment under either
is precedent for the other”) (citation omitted).
54. Determining the cause of GID itself is not very clear cut and the biological vs.
social derivation of GID has been long-debated by psychologists, with no clear consensus. See Dr. Kenneth M. Maguire, Biological Involvement in Transsexualism (Dec. 1,
2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Widener Univ.) (on file with author). Many
psychologists rely on The Harry Benjamin Association as the accepted international
authority on the standards of care for GID. See E-mail Interview with Dr. Kenneth M.
Maguire, Coordinator of the Joint Degree Doctor of Psychology and Master of Human
Sexuality Program, Widener Univ. (Jan. 5, 2006) (on file with author). A recent study
in the Netherlands concluded “there is little consensus, at least among Dutch psychiatrists, about diagnostic features of gender identity disorder.” Joost à Campo et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity of Gender Identity Disorders: A Survey among Dutch Psychiatrists, 160 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1332-36 (July 2003), available at http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/160/7/1332. Other doctors recognize that GID is “a personal conception of
oneself . . . a self-label” and its diagnosis is complicated “because the results of psychological testing are not conclusive.” Shuvo Ghosh et al., Sexuality: Gender Identity,
EMEDICINE, May 26, 2005, available at http://www.emedicine.com/ped/topic2789.htm;
see also Robert Levey et al., Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders, EMEDICINE, Apr. 16, 2004,
available at http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic3439.htm. Another professional
warns that “[m]any psychiatrists go through their entire clinical career seeing only a few
cases of gender identity disorder . . . When a disorder is this unusual, appropriate practice should be to seek the opinion and experience of physicians and psychologists who
have evaluated and cared for many of these patients.” Walter J. Meyer, III, Letter to the
Editor, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 934-35 (May 2004). Thus, there is debate as to whether
GID is medically diagnosable.
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jurisdictions have determined that GID (or transsexualism) is not a
disability.55
Regardless of how it might be characterized under the ADA,
GID is explicitly excluded from being a disability under that statute.56 Other excluded conditions include: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling,
kleptomania, pyromania and psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal use of drugs.57 Many of these conditions were excluded because of concerns that they were more similar in nature to socially constructed conditions rather than medical
disorders, and/or that they did not substantially limit major life
activities.
There are both positive and negative aspects to labeling a sexually diverse condition as a “disability.” One positive effect is protection from workplace discrimination. For example, the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), proposed by Senator Edward
Kennedy in July 2001, acknowledged that there was a qualified
need to prohibit employment discrimination in the workplace
based on sexual orientation.58 The Senate report on this bill recog55. See Holt v. N.W. Pa. Training P’ship Consortium, Inc., 694 A.2d 1134 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997) (holding that transsexualism is not a protected disability under the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act because it does not limit any bodily functions or major
life activities); Conway v. City of Hartford, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 282, at *10 (Feb. 4,
1997) (holding that transsexualism is not a disability because it was explicitly excluded
from the ADA’s definition of disability and because other jurisdictions have perpetuated that exclusion); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa
1983) (holding that transsexualism is not a protected disability under the Iowa Civil
Rights Act because it does not limit a major life activity); see also Dobre v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that gender dysphoria is
not a mental disorder because transsexualism does not limit a major life activity).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. An example of a gender identity disorder that results from
a physical impairment is a child born with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, commonly
known as “intersex.” An intersex girl has genitals so enlarged that they look male. A
recent article in the New York Times explored whether parents of children with genital
abnormalities should elect to get corrective surgery for the children in an effort to
avoid the “secrecy, shame, and medical complications” associated with this condition.
Mireya Navarro, When Gender Isn’t A Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 9, at 6. See also
JOHN COLAPINTO, AS NATURE MADE HIM (2001).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211. See also Kirshman, supra note 49 (citing HENRY H.
PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK § 3.2 (2d ed. 1991)).
58. S. REP. NO. 107-341 (2002). It is not clear what became of this proposed bill.
It was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders Calendar No.
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nized that sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace is
abundant and stems from “severe anti-gay bias.”59 It further acknowledged that sufficient evidence exists to show that discrimination harms sexually diverse employees by “threatening job security
and by fostering an oppressive work environment in which gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees fear that their sexual orientation may
be revealed to the detriment of their careers.”60 Thus, being labeled as “GID” might act as a protective measure against employment discrimination.
On the other hand, being labeled as “disabled” in the workplace has many negative consequences. By labeling GID as a “disability,” not only do sexually diverse people have to deal with anti-gay
prejudice in society, but they also have to contend with the stigmas
attached to being labeled “disabled.”61 The public bias toward persons with disabilities is best summarized in the concept of “sanism.”62 Sanism is an irrational prejudice toward or stereotype about
persons with disabilities synonymous with the “prevailing social attitudes [toward] racism and . . . homophobia.”63 In general, when
people encounter a person known to be disabled, they have already
formed an opinion about such a person. That opinion (or generalization) will often be a sanist one — i.e., a prejudiced one.64
Doe’s “condition” could, perhaps, have been more properly
analyzed on freedom of expression grounds. By analyzing her desire to wear women’s clothing as a matter of expression rather than
as a disability, the court could have avoided labeling Doe in a man763 on November 15, 2002, but there does not seem to be any further record of the bill.
Although this bill was cosponsored by forty-four senators, it appears to have stalled on
the Senate floor. See Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SN01284:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
59. Id.
60. S. REP. NO. 107-341 (2002). Although the bill does not include biases toward
persons with GID, it seems logical to extend the broad language of “sexual orientation”
to include such persons.
61. See generally Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine Re-Modeling Gender, 18 BERKLEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 15 (2003).
62. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL (2000) (explaining that the term “sanism” was first coined in the 1960s by Morton Birnbaum, who is further credited with “finding the constitutional basis for right to
treatment in the Due Process Clause”).
63. Id. at xvii.
64. See id.
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ner that ultimately renders her “disabled.” It should be noted that
Doe alternatively alleged that Atlantic’s dress code violated her
right to free speech.65 The court, however, did not address this argument because it granted her relief on the disability discrimination claim.66
In light of Doe, New York courts should reconsider the language of the outdated Xerox test. Characterizing GID as a disability
under the NYHRL threatens to open the floodgates of litigation to
people claiming that all kinds of conditions should be considered
disabilities. The ADA, which articulates a narrower test to determine what constitutes a disability and statutorily excludes some conditions from being deemed “disabilities,” serves as an effective
model to ensure that only serious mental and physical impairments
are labeled “disabilities,” while the “differently abled” are given the
freedom to express themselves as they choose.

65.
66.

Doe, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
Id.

